
2022 Charge to the NSABB














Lawrence A. Tabak, D.D.S., Ph.D. Acting Director, NIH

Lyric A. Jorgenson, Ph.D., Acting Associate Director for Science Policy, NIH

NSABB Meeting - February 28, 2022



USG Biosecurity Oversight Framework Review

- Biosecurity and safety are of paramount importance to the USG
- NIH promotes regular policy review to ensure oversight:
 - Keeps pace with scientific advances that may raise biosecurity concerns
 - Effectively balances science and security to safely enable lifesaving research
 - □ Is grounded in benefits while appropriately mitigating risks
- Charge focuses on U.S. biosecurity policy frameworks governing:
 - Research with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens
 - Dual Use Research of Concern

Oversight of DURC & P3CO

- Dual Use Research Of Concern (DURC)
 - USG Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences DURC (March 2012) requires federal funding agencies to identify DURC in their research portfolios and work to mitigate risks as needed
 - USG Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences DURC (effective 2015) requires federally-funded research institutions to establish a system to identify DURC and work with funding agencies to mitigate risks as needed
- Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO)
 - OSTP P3CO Policy Guidance (2017) directs Federal departments and agencies to adopt a department-level, multidisciplinary, pre-funding review mechanism
 - HHS P3CO Framework (2017) ensures HHS department-level pre-funding review and evaluation of proposed ePPP research

Phase 1 - P3CO Policy Review and Evaluation

- Evaluate and provide recommendations on the effectiveness of the current oversight framework (OSTP Policy Guidance and process adopted by HHS) for research involving ePPPs including:
 - Scope, in terms of preserving benefits of ePPP research while minimizing potential biosafety and biosecurity risks
 - Considerations for supporting ePPP research internationally
 - Balancing considerations regarding security and public transparency when sharing information about research involving ePPP
- Consider Policy Guidance impact on research programs and institutions

Phase 2A – DURC Policy Review and Evaluation

- Evaluate and analyze the U.S. Government federal and institutional policies for the oversight of dual use research of concern (DURC) to:
 - Evaluate effectiveness in achieving their intent
 - Evaluate impact on research institutions and U.S. Government's ability to support research
 - Identify implementation challenges
 - Evaluate effectiveness with regard to publication, public communication, and dissemination of dual-use research methodologies and results

Phase 2A – DURC Policy Review and Evaluation (cont.)

 Reevaluate DURC definition, considering advances in life sciences research and convergence with other scientific disciplines/sectors

DURC: Life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.

- Evaluate effectiveness of DURC pathogen list and experimentation type construct to determine whether:
 - Approach sufficiently addresses future potential threats, across the spectrum of life sciences research
 - Approach is conducive to research risk-mitigation
 - Alternative approaches warrant consideration

Phase 2B – P3CO Policy Review and Evaluation



- With regard to the Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight:
 - Evaluate Section 8 "Future Commitments" and provide recommendations on possible P3CO Policy Guidance incorporation into policy frameworks associated with any recommended revisions of the DURC policies

Phase 2 – Flexible and Adaptive Approaches

- Throughout Phase 2, NSABB should consider flexible and adaptive governance approaches that:
 - Keep pace with scientific advances and evolving understanding of risks and benefits
 - □ Can coalesce and integrate existing governance guidance, or policy
 - Can be applied to mitigate risk not only from research of concern but other biosecurity and biosafety considerations

Anticipated Timeline

- March: NSABB forms working group to address Phase 1
- Late Spring: Virtual listening sessions to gather public input
- May/June: NSABB forms working group to address Phase 2
- Late Summer: NSABB public stakeholder engagement meeting
- December: NSABB meeting to finalize draft report and recommendations

