

Charge to the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)

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January 23, 2020**



NSABB Charge

Phase 1 – Balancing Security and Public Transparency



- Provide recommendations to OSTP and HHS on balancing considerations regarding security and public transparency when sharing information about research involving enhanced potential pandemic pathogens
 - In developing these recommendations, consider the process adopted by HHS for the review and oversight of proposed research involving enhanced potential pandemic pathogens

NSABB Charge

Phase 2A - DURC Policy Review and Evaluation



- For OSTP and NSC, evaluate and analyze the U.S. Government federal and institutional policies for the oversight of dual use research of concern (DURC) to:
 - ❑ Evaluate effectiveness in achieving their intent
 - ❑ Evaluate impact on research institutions and U.S. Government's ability to support research
 - ❑ Identify implementation challenges
 - ❑ Evaluate effectiveness with regard to publication, public communication, and dissemination of dual-use research methodologies and results

NSABB Charge

Phase 2A - DURC policy review and evaluation

- The NSABB should also:
 - Reevaluate the DURC definition, considering advances in life sciences research and convergence with other scientific disciplines and sectors
 - Evaluate the effectiveness of the DURC pathogen list and experimentation type construct to determine:
 - If the approach sufficiently addresses future potential threats, including across the spectrum of life sciences
 - If the approach is conducive to research risk-mitigation, and
 - Whether alternative approaches warrant consideration

DURC DEFINITION:


Life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.

- Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic)
- *Bacillus anthracis*
- Botulinum neurotoxin (in any quantity)
- *Burkholderia mallei*
- *Burkholderia pseudomallei*
- Ebola virus
- Foot-and-mouth disease virus
- *Francisella tularensis*
- Marburg virus
- Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus
- Rinderpest virus
- Toxin-producing strains of *Clostridium botulinum*
- Variola major virus
- Variola minor virus
- *Yersinia pestis*

NSABB Charge

Phase 2B - P3CO policy review and evaluation

- With regard to the *Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO)*, the NSABB should:
 - Evaluate Section 8 “Future Commitments” and provide recommendations on possible *P3CO Policy Guidance* incorporation into policy frameworks associated with any recommended revisions of the DURC policies



NSABB Charge

Throughout Phase 2

- In its deliberations, the NSABB should consider the need for flexible and adaptive governance approaches that:
 - Keep pace with scientific advances and the evolving understanding of risks and benefits;
 - Can coalesce and integrate existing governance, guidance, or policy; and
 - Can be applied to mitigate risk not only from research of concern but other biosecurity and biosafety considerations

Anticipated Timeline

- **Feb 2020:** NSABB forms working group and develops workplan to address Phase 1
- **Late Spring/Early Summer 2020:** NSABB develops recommendations on balance of security and public transparency (Phase 1 completion)
- **Late Spring/Early Summer 2020:** NSABB forms working group(s) and begins review and evaluation of DURC and P3CO policies (Phase 2 launch)
- **Spring 2021:** NSABB delivers recommendations regarding DURC and P3CO policies (Phase 2 completion)

